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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, a minor tempest has been raging over the Delaware Arbitration
Program, which attempts to marry one of America’s premier business courts to the
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fundamentally more private consensual adjudicative alternative, binding
1
arbitration. At a time when commercial parties face potentially long delays in
underfunded courts, but harbor mixed views about arbitration, Delaware’s unique
concoction ostensibly offers a veritable trifecta of procedural advantages. These
include: (1) a first-rate adjudicator practiced at applying the law to complex factual
scenarios, (2) efficient case management and short cycle time and, above all, (3) a
proceeding cloaked in secrecy. For the State of Delaware, the Program represents
yet another enticement to businesses to select Delaware as the forum of choice, and
even suggests the jurisdiction’s pretensions as a potential competitor in the global
arbitration sweepstakes. For judges sitting in Delaware’s Court of Chancery,
moreover, it is a sterling entrée into a post-judicial career as an arbitrator and
2
mediator—the retirement plan du jour for American judges.
On the other hand, the Delaware Arbitration Program’s ambitious
intermingling of public and private forums brings into play the longstanding tugof-war between “the traditional party-centered view of civil litigation as a public
service for private dispute resolution and the often conflicting perception of courts
3
as ‘institutions expressive of and accountable to the public.’” The Program
triggered a constitutional challenge based on third parties’ right of access to court
proceedings. The case was heard by a judge of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation, who ruled that arbitration
proceedings heard before sitting judges of the Delaware Chancery Court were
4
“essentially” non-jury civil trials and thus were subject to public access.
The decision has been appealed to the Third Circuit. The case raises
legitimate questions about the appropriateness of structuring a program in which
sitting judges serve as arbitrators and preside over a procedure that is effectively
shielded from public view. It also implicates issues regarding the use of public
resources in ostensibly private disputes, and even the way our justice system is

* William H. Webster Chair in Dispute Resolution and Professor of Law; Academic Director, Straus
Institute for Dispute Resolution, Pepperdine University School of Law. The author wishes to thank
Matthew Diffenderfer, Adam Klapova and the organizers of the Pepperdine Journal of Business,
Entrepreneurship & the Law’s Fall, 2012 Symposium “Delaware’s Closed Door Arbitration: What the
Future Holds for Large Business Disputes and How It Will Affect M&A Deals,” Oct. 30, 2012. Thanks
also to Hsuan (Valerie) Li and Jessica Tyndall, Pepperdine University School of Law Class of 2014, for
their background research for this article.
Matthew Diffenderfer, Adam Klapova and the organizers of the Pepperdine Journal of Business,
Entrepreneurship & the Law’s Fall 2012 Symposium “Delaware’s Closed Door Arbitration: What the
Future Holds For Large Business Disputes and How It Will Affect M&A Deals,” Oct. 30, 2012.
Thanks also to Hsuan (Valerie) Li and Jessica Tyndall, Pepperdine University School of Law Class of
2014, for their background research for this article.
1
The program was “intended to preserve Delaware’s pre-eminence in offering cost-effective
options for resolving disputes, particularly those involving commercial, corporate, and technology
matters.” Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 494 (D. Del. 2012) (quoting H.R.
49, 145th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Del. 2009)).
2
See Stephanie Francis Cahill, Judge-to-Arbitrator Route Is Targeted: California Bill Would Limit
Jumping From Bench to Private Dispute Firms, 1 NO. 12 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 4 (2002).
3
Laurie Kratky Doré, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the Pursuit of
Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 287 (1999) (quoting Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment?
Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the
Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471, 1527 (1994)).
4
Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 494. The decision was appealed to the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals.
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funded.
Part II of this article explores the factors that provided the impetus for the
Delaware Arbitration Program and describes its features. Part III describes the
constitutional challenge, the arguments by opponents and proponents of the
Program, and the district court ruling striking down the Program. Part IV analyzes
the arguments for and against upholding the district court’s determination, along
with underlying evidence and other considerations, leading to the conclusion that
the district court’s decision was well-founded.
II. IMPETUS FOR, FEATURES OF THE DELAWARE PROGRAM
A. Courts in Crisis 2.0
Litigation entails big costs and risks to businesses. Although almost ninety5
nine percent of cases settle before trial, litigation represents a substantial portion
6
of corporate legal budgets. More than $21 billion is spent annually on litigation
here in the United States, and, judging by recent responses to Fulbright &
Jaworski’s annual surveys of corporate counsel, the number of U.S.-based
companies spending more than a million dollars per year on litigation is above fifty
7
percent, and growing.
The costs and risks of litigation are exacerbated by the current crisis in our
8
court system, as most states have made substantial cuts in judicial funding. The
9
State of California has delayed appointing judges, and there have been massive
10
layoffs in other court systems.
For a variety of reasons, federal judicial

5

See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459 (2004).
6
The median is approximately 29%. Second Annual Fulbright’s Litigation Trends Survey:
Findings, FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI L.L.P. (2005), at 13, http://www.fulbright.com/mediaroom/files/
FJ0536-US-V13.pdf.
7
Fulbright’s Litigation Trends Survey: A Little Less Litigation; More Regulation, FULBRIGHT &
JAWORSKI L.L.P. (2011), http://www.fulbright.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=news.detail&article_
id=9902&site_id=286 (“U.S. companies report a median spend of $1.4 million compared to $1 million
last year.”).
8
See John Schwartz, Critics Say Budget Cuts for Courts Risk Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/27/us/budget-cuts-for-state-courts-risk-rights-criticssay.html?pagewanted=all (“42 states have reduced their judicial budgets in the previous three fiscal
years, with cuts in some jurisdictions totaling more than 12 percent.”); Maura Dolan and Victoria Kim,
Budget Cuts to Worsen California Court Delays, Officials Say, L.A. TIMES (Jul. 20, 2011), available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/20/local/la-me-0720-court-cuts-20110720 (California has had a
thirty percent reduction in the past three years).
9
See Analysis of the 2008-09 Budget Bill: Criminal Justice, Judicial Branch (0250), LEGISLATIVE
ANALYST’S OFFICE (2008), http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_2008/crim_justice/cj_anl08003.aspx#zzee
_link_1_1202846137 (“Delays by the Governor in appointing the first 50 judges established in 2006–07
resulted in savings of nearly $3 million—ten positions, as of the time this analysis was prepared, still
were not filled.”).
10
E.g., Robert Gavin, State Court Layoffs Hits 17 in Capital Region as CSEA President Decries
Cuts, TIMES UNION (May 18, 2011), http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/State-court-layoffs-hit17-in-Capital-Region-as-1385047.php (367 employees laid off from New York state court system in
2011); Our View: Court System’s Troubles, GADSDEN TIMES (Feb. 19, 2013),
http://www.gadsdentimes.com/article/20130219/NEWS/130219798?p=1&tc=pg (Chief Justice Roy
Moore of the Supreme Court of Alabama predicts a twenty-five percent increase in layoffs in addition
to the twelve percent that has already been cut in recent years).
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11

appointments have also been held up, and the deluge of criminal cases on the
federal docket, coupled with the Speedy Trial Act, has meant even mega-cases like
12
the Google/Oracle dispute have taken a back seat when it comes to scheduling.
Not long ago, the American College of Trial Lawyers co-sponsored a study
of U.S. litigation that expressed significant concerns regarding high costs and
13
delays in obtaining discovery and getting to trial. The ACTL study encouraged
efforts to move beyond the present “one-size-fits-all” procedural framework and
14
promote a variety of process choices tailored to different kinds of cases.
The
authors, of course, had in mind the development of options within the litigation
system. For many corporate counsel, however, binding arbitration holds the
15
greatest potential as a vehicle for accommodating choice-based processes.
B. Going for the Arbitration Trifecta?
Some decades ago, binding arbitration was the most popular alternative for
16
resolution of business disputes that could not be settled.
Arbitrating parties
availed themselves of a wide variety of procedural options, including non17
lawyered procedures, tailored to many different kinds of commercial disputes.
Among other things, studies showed that most users believed arbitration promoted
18
faster resolution and cost-savings.
Even after leading businesses and corporate counsel began experimenting
with mediation and a variety of other approaches aimed at managing and resolving
19
conflict, arbitration remained a widely-used process choice, encouraged by a
series of Supreme Court decisions paving the way for the expansion of arbitration
across virtually the entire spectrum of civil actions, including statute-based
11
See Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Only Skin Deep?: The Cost of Partisan Politics on Minority
Diversity of the Federal Bench, 83 IND. L. J. 1423, 1448 n.157 (2008) (growing partisanship has
worsened the appointment process); Charlie Savage, Obama Lags on Judicial Picks, Limiting His Mark
on Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/18/us/politics/obama-lagson-filling-seats-in-the-judiciary.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (escalating partisan warfare has delayed
“even uncontroversial picks who would have been quickly approved in the past.”).
12
Karen Gullo and Pamela MacLean, Oracle Trial with Google Over Java Patents is Postponed,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 19, 2011), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-19/oracle-trialwith-google-over-java-patents-may-be-delayed-u-s-judge-says.html.
13
FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK
FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM
2
(2009),
available
at
http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&template=/
CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=4008.
14
Id. at 4.
15
Thomas J. Stipanowich & Ryan J. Lamare, Living with ADR: Evolving Perceptions and Use of
Mediation, Arbitration and Conflict Management in Fortune 1,000 Corporations 45, HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2221471.
16
Id. at 4–5.
17
Some forms of arbitration were pure business tribunals, with no advocacy or adjudicative role
for legal counsel. See generally Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846,
859 (1961) (discussing problem of attorney participation in arbitration process which causes inadequacy
and delay). See, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L. REV. 425,
434 n.42 (1987), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2061822 (some trade associations forbade
attorney involvement in arbitration process).
18
Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 15, at 4.
19
Id. at 27 (Chart E shows that 83% of Fortune 1,000 companies have used arbitration in the prior
three years to 2011).
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20

causes.
Many companies see arbitration as a way of saving time and money,
21
ensuring a more satisfactory process, and limiting the extent of discovery. It is
22
also a mechanism for preserving privacy and confidentiality.
Because
companies’ core assets are largely represented by intellectual property and other
proprietary information, they often take great pains to render information safe from
23
third parties. Cloaking proceedings in privacy may also be a way of keeping the
lid on other facts that might prove embarrassing—or worse.
Some legal advocates, however, feel a lingering discomfort with arbitration
as they know (or perceive) it. In a recent survey of Fortune 1,000 corporate
counsel, fully half of those responding said that their company was disinclined to
24
use arbitration in the future. Although there are always going to be situations
25
where litigation is generally preferable, a few abiding concerns are cited as
barriers to choosing arbitration. Heading the list were limitations on judicial
review of arbitration awards, the concern that arbitrators may not follow the law,
the perception that arbitrators tend to compromise, and lack of confidence in
26
neutrals. Moreover, a growing number of corporate counsel viewed high cost as
27
a barrier to the use of arbitration; this result is resonant with recent broadly
expressed concerns about growing costs and inefficiencies in commercial
28
arbitration.
In light of all of the foregoing, a form of arbitration that ensures parties a
high degree of confidentiality coupled with a fair measure of predictability (in
terms of a result that is rational and conforms to the law) and an assurance of
economy and efficiency would provide a highly desirable process—a veritable
arbitration trifecta.
29
Enter the Delaware Arbitration Program, established by a 2009 statute and
30
implemented by Chancery Court Rules.
The legislation provides that “[t]he
Court of Chancery shall have the power to arbitrate business disputes when the
parties request a member of the Court of Chancery, or such other person as may be
20

Id. at 47; JAY FOLBERG ET AL., RESOLVING DISPUTES: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND LAW 612 (2d
ed. 2010).
21
Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 15, at 43.
22
Id. at 43.
23
See THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH & PETER H. KASKELL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST:
SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR BUSINESS USERS, Ch. 6 (2001) (discussing confidentiality in arbitration
and measures for protecting trade secrets and other sensitive information).
24
Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 15, at 36 (Table N shows that 49.9% of respondents would
be unlikely or very unlikely to use arbitration for corporate/commercial disputes).
25
One example would probably be the acquisition of a public company by a strategic buyer. See
James Griffin, Address at the Pepperdine University Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship, and the
Law Symposium: Delaware’s Closed Door Arbitration: What the Future Holds For Large Business
Disputes and How It Will Affect M&A Deals (Oct. 30, 2012).
26
Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 15, at 37. Compare similar results from a recent RAND
study. See DOUGLAS SHONTZ ET AL., BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
PERCEPTIONS OF CORPORATE COUNSEL (Rand Institute for Civil Justice Report 2011).
27
Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 15, at 37 (discussing Rand Report and earlier Fortune 1,000
survey).
28
THE COLLEGE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS: PROTOCOLS FOR EXPEDITIOUS, COSTEFFECTIVE COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1–3 (Thomas J. Stipanowich et al., eds. 2010).
29
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349(a) (West 2013).
30
DEL. CH. CT. R. 96–98.
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31

authorized under rules of the Court, to arbitrate a dispute.”
In order to avail
themselves of this provision, parties must consent to the process, at least one party
must be a “business entity” formed or organized under the laws of Delaware or
32
have its principal place of business in Delaware, no party can be a “consumer,”
33
and claims for monetary damages must be at least $1,000,000.
The most notable feature of the Delaware Arbitration Program is
confidentiality, for which the program affords special protections. The legislation
provides that “[a]rbitration proceedings shall be considered confidential and not of
public record until such time, if any, as the proceedings are the subject of an
34
appeal.” Such appeal would be to the Delaware Supreme Court in the form of an
“application to vacate, stay, or enforce an order of the Court of Chancery issued in
35
an arbitration proceeding.” The Supreme Court is to “exercise its authority in
conformity with the Federal Arbitration Act, and such general principles of law
36
and equity as are not inconsistent with that Act.” In line with Supreme Court
interpretations, application of FAA standards would make review of awards for
37
errors of fact or law extremely unlikely.
The implementing Chancery Court Rules strongly reinforce the element of
confidentiality in several ways, cloaking all aspects of the entire arbitration
procedure in secrecy. First of all, “[P]etition[s] [for arbitration] and any supporting
documents are considered confidential and not of public record until such time, if
any, as the proceedings are the subject of an appeal,” and are therefore not to be
38
included in the Chancery Court’s public docketing system. Furthermore, state
the rules,
[a]rbitration hearings are private proceedings such that only parties and their
representatives may attend, unless all parties agree otherwise. . . . Any
communication made in or in connection with the arbitration that relates to any

31

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349(a).
This is a significant, well-considered and laudable limitation on the Program. While
confidentiality is often a prized element of business-to-business arbitration, its use in arbitration in the
context of adhesion contracts, notably those involving individual employees and consumers of goods
and services, may give rise to tangible concerns about fairness because confidentiality requirements
often operate to the relative detriment of individuals. See Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy
Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1121, 1228-1253 (2006); Thomas J. Stipanowich, The
Arbitration Fairness Index: Using a Public Rating System to Skirt the Legal Logjam and Promote
Fairer and More Effective Arbitration of Employment and Consumer Disputes, 60 U. KAN. L. REV.
985, 1047, 1056 (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2004543. A
number of courts have found broad confidentiality clauses in adhesion contracts to be unconscionable
and therefore unenforceable. See Pokorny v. Quixtar, Inc., 601 F.3d 987, 1001–02 (9th Cir. 2010);
Ting v. Ting, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 2003); Sprague v. Household Int’l, 473 F. Supp. 2d
966, 974–75 (W.D. Mo. 2005); McKee v. AT&T Corp., 191 P.3d 845, 858–59 (Wash. 2008); Schnuerle
v. Insight Commc’ns Co., L.P., 376 S.W.3d 561, 577–78 (Ky. 2012). But see Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc.
v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 175–76 (5th Cir. 2004) (confidentiality provision did not
render clause unconscionable); Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Servs., IV, Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 279–80 (3d
Cir. 2004) (same).
33
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349(b).
34
Id.
35
Id. § 349(c).
36
Id.
37
Id. § 349(b).
38
DEL. CH. CT. R. 97(a)(4); Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 496 (D. Del.
2012).
32
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controversy being arbitrated, whether made to the Arbitrator or a party, or to any
39
person if made at an arbitration hearing, is confidential.

This expansive language of confidentiality applying to all participants and all
communications appears to go well beyond standard arbitration procedures, which
typically give general direction to arbitrators and administrative organizations to
40
“maintain” the privacy of the proceedings.
Under the circumstances, one
wonders if the provisions were modeled in part on procedures for mediation or
41
other settlement-oriented ADR processes!
The arbitrator’s final award is automatically transformed into a judgment of
42
the Court of Chancery —a decree which is not of public record unless and until it
43
is the subject of a motion to the Supreme Court of Delaware. Although awardscum-judgments are available on the LexisNexis File & Serve system under the
44
heading of “arbitration judgments,” no case or party information is included. In
this way, it appears, the authors of the Delaware program sought to create a
judicially administered version of arbitration which would effectively function sub
rosa save in those situations where appeal is taken to the Supreme Court.
Delaware’s arbitration model also aims to address businesses’ concern that
arbitrators, whose decisions (awards) are not typically reviewable on the merits,
39

DEL. CH. CT. R. 98(b).
R-23. Attendance at Hearings
The arbitrator and the AAA shall maintain the privacy of the hearings unless the
law provides to the contrary. Any person having a direct interest in the
arbitration is entitled to attend hearings. The arbitrator shall otherwise have the
power to require the exclusion of any witness, other than a party or other
essential person, during the testimony of any other witness. It shall be
discretionary with the arbitrator to determine the propriety of the attendance of
any other person other than a party and its representatives.
Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures (Including Procedures for Large, Complex
Commercial Disputes), AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, (Jun. 1, 2009), available at
http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/rules/searchrules/rulesdetail?doc=ADRSTG_004130&_afrLoop=7191437
01526582&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=q935mgajk_44#%40%3F_afrWindowId%3Dq935m
gajk_44%26_afrLoop%3D719143701526582%26doc%3DADRSTG_004130%26_afrWindowMode%3
D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3Dq935mgajk_96.
Rule 26. Confidentiality and Privacy
(a) JAMS and the Arbitrator shall maintain the confidential nature of the
Arbitration proceeding and the Award, including the Hearing, except as
necessary in connection with a judicial challenge to or enforcement of an Award,
or
unless
otherwise
required
by
law
or
judicial
decision.
(b) The Arbitrator may issue orders to protect the confidentiality of proprietary
information,
trade
secrets
or
other
sensitive
information.
(c) Subject to the discretion of the Arbitrator or agreement of the Parties, any
person having a direct interest in the Arbitration may attend the Arbitration
Hearing. The Arbitrator may exclude any non-Party from any part of a Hearing.
JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules & Procedures, JUDICIAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION
SERVICES, INC., (Oct. 1, 2010), available at http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMSRules/JAMS_comprehensive_arbitration_rules-2010.pdf.
41
Perhaps not coincidentally, the rules provide for the judge/arbitrator to act as mediator upon
request of the parties. DEL. CH. CT. R. 98(d). Although by no means unprecedented, provisions for
“med/arb” are unusual in U.S. practice. See STIPANOWICH & KASKELL, supra note 23, at 20–21.
42
“Upon the granting of a final award, a final judgment or decree shall be entered in conformity
therewith and be enforced as any other judgment or decree.” DEL. CH. CT. R. 98(f)(3).
43
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349(c).
44
See Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 497 (D. Del. 2012).
40
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might not make decisions in accordance with legal principles and might engage in
45
unsuitable compromise.
Here, of course, a sitting judge would be making the
decision. In the words of Chief Justice Myron Steele of the Delaware Supreme
Court,
[Business parties] want a competent resolution within an expeditious period of
time. And they want some predictability of outcome from the process. [In the
Delaware Program y]ou get an arbitrator who’s knowledgeable about the current
state of the law and who’s accustomed to apply the law. It’s not ‘catch as catch
can’ from a list that the parties pare down, hoping to get one or three to sit as
46
arbitrators in the case.

For cautious, control-minded counsel, the ability to consult a would-be
decision-maker’s recent published opinions is likely to be perceived as a
47
48
significant benefit; pertinent knowledge and experience is also critical.
A third and growing concern of businesses has to do with the cost and time
associated with adjudication—the fear that arbitration, like litigation, will turn into
49
costly and lengthy procedural quagmire. Here again, proponents assert that the
Delaware Program offers unique advantages, since Delaware Chancery judges are
noted for their ability to handle cases quickly and efficiently. Justice Steele
strongly suggests that, contrary to the broad run of journeyman arbitrators,
Chancery judges are incentivized to get the hearing done quickly: “You get an
arbitrator with no personal, financial interest in [prolonging the arbitration] . . . .
members of the Court of Chancery get paid the same, whether they resolve this
50
case in 3 days or 90 days.”
Among Chancery judges, he points out, efficient
habits of mind are reinforced by a Chancery Court Rule to the effect that the
arbitration hearing “generally will occur no later than 90 days following receipt of
51
the petition [for arbitration].”
For Delaware, the Arbitration Program is an opportunity to enhance its
reputation as the friendliest forum for business in the United States, and to derive
at least some additional recompense from parties for the services of public
52
judges.
A more lucrative result may proceed from an increase in charter fees

45
Myron T. Steele, Chief Justice, Del. Supreme Court, Keynote Address at the Journal of
Business, Entrepreneurship, & the Law Symposium: Delaware’s Closed Door Arbitration: What the
Future Holds For Large Business Disputes and How It Will Affect M&A Deals (Oct. 30, 2012), in 6 J.
BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 375.
46
Id.
47
“[I]t really is a draw where you actually have folks who have published opinions that you can
look at and have a sense of predictability.” Katherine Blair, Partner, K & L Gates, Keynote Address at
the Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship, & the Law Symposium: Delaware’s Closed Door
Arbitration: What the Future Holds For Large Business Disputes and How It Will Affect M&A Deals
(Oct. 30, 2012), in 6 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 375, 382
48
See Distinguished Visiting Practitioner James Griffin, Address at the Journal of Business,
Entrepreneurship, and & Law Symposium: Delaware’s Closed Door Arbitration: What the Future Holds
for Large Business Disputes and How it Will Affect M&A Deals (Oct. 30, 2012), in 6. J. BUS.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 375, 383 (expressing confidence in knowledge of Court of Chancery judges
regarding how M&A deals are done).
49
See Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 15, at 38, 46–47.
50
Steele, supra note 45, at 381.
51
See DEL. CH. CT. R. 97(e).
52
Use of the Program entails a $12,000 filing fee and $6,000 per day for the service. Brian Farkas,
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from businesses seeking to avail themselves of the new Program by incorporating
53
in Delaware. And for Court of Chancery judges, there is the ability to augment
their resumes with expertise in another form of adjudication and enhance their
54
credentials for a post-judicial future as private dispute resolvers.
But when all is said and done, the success of the Program depends on the
buy-in of corporations, and dispute resolution tends to be very low on the list of
55
In the words of a Los Angeles M&A
priorities in corporate deal-making.
56
attorney, “It’s last on the list, if anything. It’s a throw-in.”
Moreover,
corporations are notoriously cautious about innovating when it comes to
experimenting with new and untried methods of resolving business disputes. As
the M&A lawyer puts it, her clients “like to cross the street with a bunch of
57
folks.”
Given the native caution of corporations and counsel respecting new
concepts and new options, the last thing the Delaware Arbitration Program needed
was a well-publicized challenge to its constitutionality. Enter an organization
styling itself the Delaware Coalition for Open Government, Inc.
III. A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
In 2010, the Delaware Coalition for Open Government, a nonprofit
organization, challenged the Delaware Arbitration Program by means of a suit
58
against the five judges of the Delaware Court of Chancery.
The Coalition
contended that the defendants, “under color of State law, constitute[d] an unlawful
deprivation of the public’s right of access to trials in violation of the First
Amendment as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
59
States Constitution.”
“Although the statute and rules call the procedure
60
arbitration,” the Coalition argued, “it is really litigation under another name,”
except for the fact that it was conducted “behind closed doors instead of in open
61
court.”
Citing Supreme Court decisions and other precedents recognizing the
right of the public and press to attend judicial proceedings, both civil and criminal,
62
and to review documents filed in court, the complaint sought to have the relevant
Sitting Judges as Arbitrators: The Delaware Experiment, LAW STUDENT CONNECTION, (May 16, 2012,
1:54pm), available at http://nysbar.com/blogs/lawstudentconnection/2012/05/sitting_judges_as_
arbitrators_.html.
53
See Steele, supra note 45, at 392.
54
See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and Choice: Taking Charge of the “New Litigation”, 7
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 383, 405 (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=1372291 [hereinafter Arbitration and Choice].
55
Id. at 408.
56
Katherine Blair, supra note 47, at 386.
57
Id.
58
Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 493 (D. Del. 2012).
59
Complaint at 5, Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493 (No. 11:11CV01015), 2011 WL
5042086.
60
Id. at 4.
61
Id.
62
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (holding the public and press
have a right to attend criminal trials); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir.
1984) (holding the public and press have the right to attend civil trials); N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v.
Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 217 (3d Cir. 2002) (same).
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legislation and implementing Chancery Rules declared unconstitutional and to
enjoin the defendant judges from conducting non-public arbitration proceedings
63
under the program.
An amicus curiae brief filed by various media outlets in support of the
complaint emphasized the press’ “strong interest in upholding the public’s right to
64
access, monitor and report on the proceedings of this nation’s court system.” The
brief elucidated the various benefits of open access to court proceedings, including
the disclosure of information to the public, sufficient to “alert consumers to
potential dangers posed by products . . .” and the ability of the public to monitor
65
courts’ conduct. It raised concerns about the impact of closed proceedings on the
rights of concerned third party parties, including shareholders of arbitrating
66
corporations. The brief asserted that
[p]arties concerned about the confidentiality of information . . . related to private
arbitration do not have to consent to the jurisdiction of the Chancery Court. But
when they do invoke the authority of a publicly funded court, the rules governing
confidentiality change, and a presumption in favor of openness attaches to the
67
records at issue.

By way of example, the brief cited Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Rite
68
Aid Corp., in which a court considering competing motions to vacate or to
confirm an arbitration award declined to maintain the entire record of arbitration
proceedings under seal in light of, among other things, “the common law
69
presumption of public access” to court proceedings.
In support of their motion for judgment on the pleadings, the defendants filed
a joint brief founded on the premise that in order to establish a right of access to
governmental proceedings, the plaintiff was required to plead and prove that the
type of proceeding involved has historically been accessible to the press and
public, and that “public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of
the proceeding, including consideration of whether public access impairs the
70
public good.” The brief was replete with citations supporting the longstanding
71
recognition of the inherent privacy of arbitration proceedings. It alluded to the

63

Complaint, supra note 59, at 5.
Brief Amici Curiae of the Reporter’s Committee for Freedom of the Press and Five News
Organizations in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on
the Pleadings and Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 6, Del. Coal. for Open
Gov’t, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493 (No. 11:11CV01015), 2012 WL 487833 [hereinafter Media Amicus Curiae
Brief].
65
Media Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 64, at 9.
66
Tim Shaffer, The Life and Death of Delaware’s Arbitration Experiment, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 31,
2012, 11:58 AM), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/31/the-life-and-death-ofdelawares-arbitration-experiment.
67
Media Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 64, at 6.
68
Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Rite Aid Corp., 345 F. Supp. 2d 497 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
69
Id. at 504.
70
Defendants’ Opening Brief in Support of their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 5, Del.
Coal. for Open Gov’t, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493 (No. 1:11–1015), 2011 WL 6401166 [hereinafter
Defendants’ Opening Brief].
71
Id. at 12–13.
64
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72

ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which acknowledges that judges may
73
“‘act as an arbitrator . . .’ when ‘expressly authorized by law.’”
It also drew
attention to the employment of court-annexed arbitration in federal district court
74
ADR programs and provisions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of
75
1998 that list voluntary arbitration (subject to a right of trial de novo) among
ADR options available to Federal courts, and related provisions for confidentiality
76
of ADR proceedings.
The defendants asserted that allowing public access to
arbitration proceedings under the Delaware Program would prompt businesses to
seek other arbitration forums and thereby harm the public due to the “stifling effect
77
on Delaware’s efforts to ‘remain at the cutting-edge in dispute resolution,’” and
Delaware’s consequent inability to compete in the international market for
78
arbitration forums. The defendants’ brief also pointed out that there would be
public access to any proceedings brought to challenge or confirm arbitration
79
awards in the Delaware Supreme Court.
Finally, it sought to distinguish the
80
prescribed arbitration procedure from litigation.
Sitting by designation, Federal District Court Judge Mary McLaughlin held
that the proceedings before the Delaware Court of Chancery were in essence civil
trials, and therefore subject to the requirements of the First Amendment respecting
81
right of access by members of the public and press. Judge McLaughlin’s opinion
stressed the inherent distinctions between arbitration as a consensual “private
82
system of justice” and judicial process. She observed that “arbitration decisions
83
are ad hoc, lacking any precedential value.”
Although arbitrators and judges
share many characteristics, arbitrators are empowered by private agreement while
judges are beholden to the public, and supervise “proceedings [of] a public
character in which remedies are devised to vindicate the policies of the [law], not
84
merely to afford private relief.” She found it significant that the defendants were
unable to point to specific examples of judges serving as arbitrators in the ABA
85
Code of Judicial Conduct. She also observed that sitting judges do not serve as
arbitrators in court-connected proceedings and, indeed, are specifically prohibited

72

Id. at 13 n.4.
Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 502. The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct
is cited as permitting arbitration by judges. Id. However, as observed by Judge McLaughlin, no
examples of such appointments were cited. Id. Similarly, the defendants cited the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. § 652(d), as authorizing (among other things) arbitration by a
Magistrate Judge. Defendants’ Opening Brief, supra note 70, at 14. Again, as noted by Judge
McLaughlin, no actual examples of binding arbitration were offered. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 894 F.
Supp. 2d at 502.
74
Defendants’ Opening Brief, supra note 70, at 14–16.
75
Id. at 14–15.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 17 (quoting H.R. 49, 145th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Del. 2009)).
78
Id.
79
Id. at 6–7.
80
Id. at 19–20.
81
Del Coal. for Open Gov’t, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 494.
82
Id. at 500–01.
83
Id. at 501.
84
Id. at 501–02 (quoting Hutchings v. U.S. Indus. Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 311–12 (5th Cir.1970)).
85
Id. at 502.
73
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86

from doing so by case precedents in some jurisdictions. She then enumerated
certain elements of proceedings under the Delaware Arbitration Program that were
sufficiently like trial to bring into play policies of open access, including (1)
selection of judges as arbitrators by the Chancellor; (2) a sitting judge, paid by the
state, presiding over a proceeding with the assistance of state personnel in public
facilities; (3) the wielding of arbitral as well as judicial authority by the judge; and
87
(4) the rendition of a final enforceable order by the judge.
The Chancery Court judges appealed the district court’s decision to the Third
88
Circuit on October 11, 2012, presaging a battle that some say may continue all
89
the way to the United States Supreme Court. Briefs filed by the parties and a
number of amici curiae reiterated and expanded upon the arguments raised in the
90
district court. Given the interest generated by the case and the policies involved,
it is appropriate to look more closely at the Delaware Arbitration Program and the
rationale of the district court.
IV. REFLECTIONS ON THE DELAWARE ARBITRATION PROGRAM AND ITS
CONSTITUTIONALITY
Was Federal District Court Judge Mary McLaughlin on solid ground in
holding that the proceedings before the Delaware Court of Chancery under the
Delaware Arbitration Program were in essence civil trials, and therefore subject to
the requirements of the First Amendment respecting right of access by members of
91
the public and the press? On appeal, counsel for the Delaware Chancery Court
judges argued that the district court improperly used that conclusion to avoid
applying the “logic and experience test” to determine “if there is a public right of
92
access to a particular proceeding or record.”
They argued that the Program
established a framework for proceedings that included “key distinctions between
arbitration and litigation”: a consent-based process, with decisions made “outside
the judicial system” and “ad hoc, lacking any precedential value;” permitting
parties to “specify the scope of the arbitrator’s authority and design the applicable
86

Id.
Id. at 502–03.
88
Brief for Appellants, Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493 (No. 12-3859), 2012 WL
6639543 [hereinafter Brief for Appellants].
89
Thomson Reuters, Constitution Bars ‘Secret’ Delaware Trials, Open-Government Group Says,
27 NO. 14 WESTLAW J. DEL. CORP. 2 (2013).
90
See Brief of Amici Curiae the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and the
Business Roundtable in Support of Defendants-Appellants and Reversal of the Judgment Below, Del.
Coal. for Open Gov’t, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493 (No. 12-3859), 2012 WL 6837826 [hereinafter Brief of
Amici Curiae the Chamber of Commerce]; Brief of Amicus Curiae the Corporation Law Section of the
Delaware State Bar Association in Support of Defendants-Appellants, Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 894
F. Supp. 2d 493 (No. 12-3859), 2012 WL 6837827 [hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae the Corporation
Law Section]; Brief of Amicus Curiae Public Citizen, Inc. in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee Delaware
Coalition for Open Government, Inc. Urging Affirmance, Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 894 F. Supp. 2d
493 (No 12-3859), 2013 WL 175551; Brief of Amici Curiae the Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press and Twelve News Organizations in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee, Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t,
894 F. Supp. 2d 493 (No. 12-3859), 2013 WL 175552.
91
See supra text accompanying note 62.
92
Brief for Appellants, supra note 88, at 15, 20. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448
U.S. 555 (1980); Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); El Vocero de P.R. v. Puerto
Rico, 508 U.S. 147 (1993).
87
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procedural rules;” allowing parties to “resolve disputes without aspects often
associated with the legal system: procedural delay and cost of discovery, the
93
adversarial relationship of the parties, and publicity of the dispute.” Because it
established a form of arbitration, there was no public access requirement for the
reason that “[p]roceedings before [] arbitrator[s] traditionally have been
94
confidential [and] there is no history of public access.”
They stated that to
authorize judges to sit as arbitrators “does not transform the commercial arbitration
proceeding into a judicial trial” because of the “settled principle that States may
95
endow judges with non-judicial responsibilities.”
The district court’s contrary
conclusion would result in detriment not only to the State of Delaware and to
businesses seeking effective alternatives to litigation, but to the policies supporting
96
court-connected ADR programs throughout the country.
Therefore, they
concluded, the district court committed reversible error.
In response, counsel for the appellee, the Delaware Coalition for Open
Government, Inc., argued that the district court “properly ignored labels and
looked to see whether there was a sufficiently analogous government proceeding to
which the right of public access attaches (as opposed to practices in the private
97
sector).” The district court properly recognized that where “a State-empowered
judge engages in a core judicial function—hearing evidence, applying the facts to
the law, and making binding determinations affecting the substantive legal rights
of the parties, which determinations are immediately enforceable by the State[,]
98
the . . . process is effectively a civil bench trial of commercial disputes.”
Therefore, the proceeding “was [properly] subject to the right of public access to
99
judicial proceedings . . . .”
Because the Delaware Arbitration Program was
different from court-connected ADR practices in other jurisdictions, they would
100
not be affected by upholding the district court’s decision.
Neither would the
decision cause businesses to eschew private arbitration in the U.S for foreign
101
forums whose arbitrators lack the pertinent expertise in U.S. law.
Finally,
“[n]either Delaware’s desire to facilitate new revenue streams nor the business
community’s desire to hide its conduct from public scrutiny justifie[d] subverting
102
the First Amendment.”
A careful assessment of the arguments and underlying evidence, along with
other considerations, leads to the conclusion that the district court’s decision is
well-founded and should be upheld.
A. The District Court’s Conclusion That the Delaware Arbitration Program

93

Brief for Appellants, supra note 88, at 16–17.
Id. at 21–22.
95
Id. at 21.
96
Id. at 66–68.
97
Brief for Appellee at 10, Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493 (D. Del.
2012) (No. 12-3859), 2013 WL 100597 [hereinafter Brief for Appellee].
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 11.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 12.
94
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Establishes a Privatized Version of Court Trial Appears to Be WellFounded
Was the district court correct in concluding that the Delaware Arbitration
Program was essentially a privatized court trial, and therefore subject to the public
access requirements of the First Amendment? Or, did the court err in subjecting a
system of private arbitration to public access requirements merely because a sitting
judge could be the arbitrator?
By establishing sitting judges as the keystone of an adjudicative system that
is effectively wholly shielded from public view through the rendition of a legally
binding judgment, the Delaware Arbitration Program represents an unprecedented
juxtaposition of public trial and private adjudication with no historical or current
counterparts. Furthermore, the only significant practical effect of the procedure—
that is, the only aspect of the procedure that is not already available to litigants in
public trial or, alternatively, in arbitration—is to place proceedings before a sitting
judge behind closed doors. For these reasons, the court’s conclusion appears wellfounded.
i. The Delaware Arbitration Program represents an unprecedented
juxtaposition of public and private adjudicative spheres
The body of legislation and judicial decisions respecting the requirements of
public access to judicial proceedings and “judicial documents” has played out
against the backdrop of a struggle between those who see judicial system as a
mechanism for problem solving and the promotion of settlement, and those who
103
see it as vindicating public rights, and see litigation is a kind of public property.
The Delaware Arbitration Program, under which sitting publicly appointed judges
are authorized to preside over privatized and wholly confidential proceedings,
must be viewed against the backdrop of this body of law and the underlying policy
dynamics.
Although the law of public access that developed in various ways in different
104
jurisdictions, that body of law generally reflects a kind of balancing between the
105
“problem-solving” and “public rights” approaches
in that it recognizes that
different forms of litigation and different elements of the litigation process present
stronger or weaker bases for public access depending on historical and functional
106
factors.
Among functional factors affecting public access to elements of civil
litigation, a key factor appears to be the proximity of the element to the core
107
judicial function.
The argument for public access to a court-related proceeding

103
Kratky Doré, supra note 3, at 289, 295–96; see also Amie Sloane, Secret Settlements and
Protecting Health and Safety: How Can We Disclose With Our Mouths Shut?, 3 APPALACHIAN J.L. 61,
61 (2004); James E. Rooks, Jr., Let the Sun Shine In, 39-JUN TRIAL 18, 19 (2003).
104
Kratky Doré, supra note 3, at 311–16; see also Andrew D. Goldstein, Sealing and Revealing:
Rethinking the Rules Governing Public Access to Information Generated Through Litigation, 81 CHI.KENT L. REV. 375, 391–400 (2006); George F. Carpinello, Public Access to Court Records In New
York: Experience Under Uniform Rule 216.1 and the Rule’s Future In a World of Electronic Filing, 66
ALB. L. REV. 1089 (2003).
105
Kratky Doré, supra note 3, at 311–16.
106
Id. at 321–22.
107
Id. at 318, 402.
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or to documents is least powerful when the latter are furthest removed from core
108
109
110
judicial functions,
as in discovery
and settlement-oriented activities.
Conversely, it is most powerful within the purview of core judicial functions such
111
as adjudication of a case on the merits; here, proponents of the “public rights”
112
approach say there must be public access.
To the extent that confidentiality
serves to promote collaborative activities that facilitate the settlement of litigated
113
disputes, then, some argue that it serves to conserve judicial resources.
Such
arguments are naturally weakest when public access is sought to court trial.
Private binding arbitration is a wholly different realm. It is a thing apart,
founded on private agreement, and fundamentally depended on the choices made
114
by the private parties.
The Federal Arbitration Act and state arbitration statutes
tend to carefully demarcate the interface between arbitration and the courts which
are sometimes called upon to facilitate arbitration processes by enforcing
arbitration agreements, appointing arbitrators, enforcing subpoenas, and
115
confirming, modifying or vacating awards.
As a thing apart, arbitration is not
116
touched by the law of public access as it affects public judicial proceedings.
117
Arbitration proceedings are generally conducted in private,
and arbitrating
parties sometimes enhance the protections surrounding arbitration by entering into
118
agreements for confidentiality.
When arbitrating parties seek to avail themselves of the assistance of a judge,
however, they potentially fall within the ambit of public access law. As observed
in a recent federal court decision, “while parties to an arbitration are generally
‘permitted to keep their private undertakings from the prying eyes of others,’ the
‘circumstance changes when a party seeks to enforce in federal court the fruits of
119
their private agreement to arbitration, i.e. the arbitration award.’”
Thus, when
arbitrating parties seek the sanction of courts for arbitration awards, those awards
and related pleadings may be considered “judicial documents” because of their
120
relevance to the decision of a court to confirm or vacate an arbitration award.
108

Id. at 375–77, 379.
Id. at 370–71.
110
Id. at 395.
111
Id. at 382.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 293.
114
Stipanowich, Arbitration and Choice, supra note 54, at 387.
115
Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration Penumbra: Arbitration Law and the Rapidly Changing
Landscape of Dispute Resolution, 8 NEV. L.J. 427, 430–31 (2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1007490.
116
Peter W. Billings, Sr., ADR and Access to the Courts, 8 UTAH B.J. 12, 13 (1995); Schmitz,
supra note 32, at 1214.
117
Schmitz, supra note 32, at 1211.
118
Id. at 1214.
119
Century Indem. Co. v. AXA Belgium, No. 11 Civ. 7263(JMF), 2012 WL 4354816, at *14
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2012) (quoting Global Reinsurance Corp.-U.S. Branch v. Argonaut Ins. Co., No. 07
Civ. 8196(PKC), 2008 WL 126976, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2008), amended by Global Reinsurance
Corp.-U.S. Branch v. Argonaut Ins. Co., No. 07 Civ. 8350(PKC), 2008 WL 1805459 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
21, 2008)).
120
D.H. Blair & Co., Inc. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 109 (2d Cir. 2006); Century Indem. Co. v.
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 592 F. Supp. 2d 825, 827 (E.D. Pa. 2009); Zurich Am. Ins.
Co. v. Rite Aid Corp., 345 F. Supp. 2d 497, 503–05 (E.D. Pa. 2004); Alexandria Real Estate Equities,
Inc. v. Fair, No. 11 Civ. 3694(LTS), 2011 WL 6015646, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2011); Global
109
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In recent years, the bright line between arbitration and litigation has in some
respects blurred as arbitration has taken on many more of the vestiges of litigation
121
in a public forum.
Today, arbitrators handle virtually any kind of civil claim or
122
123
controversy, including even antitrust
and discrimination
claims and other
statutory causes of action. Arbitration proceedings frequently bear close
124
resemblance to civil litigation, and may even result in the imposition of socially
125
exemplary remedies such as punitive damages or statutory damages.
There are
126
arbitration agreements that call for arbitrator appointments to be made by courts;
this is, in fact, the default resolution under federal and state statutes when the
appointment mechanism established by the parties, if any, fails of its intended
127
purpose.
And although the Supreme Court has indicated that parties may not
contractually expand the limited statutory bases for judicial vacatur of arbitration
128
awards under the Federal Arbitration Act,
it is now possible in a few
jurisdictions to create a kind of public/private hybrid procedure by means of a
contractual provision for judicial review of arbitration awards for errors of law or
129
fact.
There is also no question that, practically speaking, public access to the
elements of civil trial is not unlimited, and judges engage in activities that are not
strictly adjudicative and which may occur beyond the public purview. Trial judges
sometimes conduct private settlement conferences in which they encourage, cajole
130
and browbeat parties into a negotiated resolution.
Moreover, they may employ
and occasionally even participate in relatively confidential court-connected ADR
131
processes aimed at encouraging pre-trial settlement of disputes.
They may also
have occasion to seal court records to assure protection from the prying eyes of
132
competitors and other third parties.
There remains, however, an essential, meaningful dividing line between
public courts and private binding arbitration. Again, when arbitrating parties avail
themselves of the court system before, during or after the process, as stated above,
Reinsurance, 2008 WL 1805459, at *2.
121
See generally Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation”, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV.
1 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1297526 [hereinafter The
New Litigation].
122
See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
123
See Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009).
124
See generally Stipanowich, The New Litigation, supra note 121.
125
FOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 20, at 597.
126
See, e.g., Davis v. Melnicke, 25 A.D.3d 503 (N.Y. 2006); Pisciotta v. Newspaper Enter., Inc., 5
A.D.2d 1014 (N.Y. 1958).
127
IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL ARBITRATION
LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT § 27.3.1.1
(1996).
128
Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 578 (2008).
129
See, e.g., Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 190 P.3d 586 (Cal. 2008); NAFTA
Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84 (Tex. 2011).
130
Peter Robinson, Settlement Conference Judge—Legal Lion or Problem Solving Lamb: An
Empirical Documentation of Judicial Settlement Conference Practices and Techniques, 33 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 113, 157 (2009).
131
ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA, ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN THE FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS 60–67 (1996).
132
See Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 494 (D. Del. 2012).
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they open themselves to greater scrutiny. A motion to confirm or vacate an
arbitration award creates the possibility that the rights of access of third parties to
court proceedings and related documents may entail a loss or diminishing of the
133
confidentiality experienced by the parties in arbitration.
To establish a class of
arbitration that is subject to a general requirement of confidentiality and is presided
over by a sitting judge appears to represent a dramatic departure from this reality.
This brings us to the argument made by proponents of the Delaware
Arbitration that arbitration has been regularly employed as one of the ADR options
134
in court-connected programs.
They assert that such proceedings are sometimes
135
treated as confidential,
and, furthermore, may be presided over by sitting
136
judges.
On close examination, however, the precedents cited are not equivalent to
137
The practical reality is that court-connected
traditional binding arbitration.
arbitration proceedings do not automatically produce a binding arbitration award,
since any party has the right to request trial de novo for a period after the rendition
138
of an award.
Nonbinding court-connected arbitration proceedings are usually
abbreviated processes aimed at promoting a negotiated resolution short of trial, and
139
may be limited in application to cases below a certain dollar value.
Aside from
distant historical examples, the defendants’ brief at trial offered no specific
examples of actual proceedings in which sitting judges were appointed as
arbitrators in private, binding arbitration proceedings resulting in an enforceable
140
judgment, as here.
And although, as stated above, their appellate brief purported
to offer such examples, the appellee’s brief demonstrated that all of these programs
appear to be of the standard court-connected nonbinding variety described
141
above.
Thus, the Delaware Arbitration Program represents a significant leap beyond
any other venture along the borderline between public and private adjudicative
forums. Research has thus far failed to uncover any other scheme remotely like it.
Moreover, as Judge McLaughlin observed, some courts have ruled that
because of inherent conflicts between the two roles sitting judges should not serve
142
as arbitrators.
Relatively few published decisions have addressed situations
143
where sitting judges have allowed themselves to be fashioned as arbitrators.
In
133

E.g., Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Rite Aid Corp., 345 F. Supp. 2d 497, 503–04 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
Brief for Appellants, supra note 88, at 44–47.
135
Id. at 47.
136
Id.
137
Brief for Appellee, supra note 97, at 32–38, 49–54.
138
28 U.S.C. § 657(c)(1) (2012).
139
PLAPINGER, supra note 131, at 60–67.
140
See supra text accompanying note 87.
141
Brief for Appellee, supra note 97, at 32–38.
142
Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 502.
143
See DDI Seamless Cylinder Int’l, Inc. v. General Fire Extinguisher Corp., 14 F.3d 1163 (7th
Cir. 1994); Brandt v. MIT Development Corp., 552 F. Supp. 2d 304 (D. Conn. 2008); Hameli v.
Nazario, 930 F. Supp. 171 (D. Del. 1996); Ovadiah v. New York Ass’n for New Americans, Nos. 95
Civ. 10523 (SS), 96 Civ. 330 (SS), 1997 WL 342411 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Heenan v. Sobati, 96 Cal. App.
4th 995 (2002); Elliot v. Ten Eyck P’ship v. City of Long Beach, 57 Cal. App. 4th 495 (1997); see also
Charles H. Smith, When Is An Arbitrator Not An Arbitrator? When A Sitting Judge Serves As A Private
Arbitrator, 60-OCT DISP. RESOL. J. 29, 33 n.23 (2005).
134
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such cases, the usual result is expressions of doubt or incredulity by appellate
courts who find themselves in the position of trying to salvage the situation by re144
casting the “arbitration award” as a court judgment.
The most prominent of
these decisions is DDI Seamless Cylinder International, Inc. v. General Fire
145
Extinguisher Corp., in which Judge Richard Posner concluded that an agreement
purporting to arbitrate a contract action before a federal magistrate would be
treated as “an abbreviated, informal procedure for [the magistrate’s] deciding the
146
case in his judicial capacity.”
This was necessary in order to prevent the
magistrate’s decision from being deemed ultra vires, since “arbitration is not in the
job description of a federal judge, including . . . a magistrate judge . . . . Federal
statutes authorizing arbitration . . . do not appear to authorize or envisage the
147
appointment of judges or magistrate judges as arbitrators.”
Posner’s decision was approvingly cited at length in a decision of the District
148
of Delaware, Hameli v. Nazario, in which the court was also confronted with the
question of the legal effect of a decision by a federal magistrate under a purported
agreement to arbitrate. In Hameli, the court avoided having to directly address the
efficacy of the purported agreement on the basis that the magistrate lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the issues in dispute. In a footnote, however, the court
149
observed that under the Civil Justice Reform Act, which laid the groundwork for
court-connected ADR programs throughout the federal system, “the magistrate
150
judge has played an ever increasing part in settlement negotiations . . . .”
The
court noted that its own local rule, moreover, authorized magistrates “to ‘[c]onduct
various alternative dispute resolution processes, including but not limited to judgehosted settlement conferences, mediation, arbitration, early neutral evaluation, and
151
summary trials (jury and nonjury).”
It was evident, therefore, that magistrate
judges “assume a variety of roles in the course of aiding the district court . . .
152
including those of mediator and adjudicator.”
Importantly, however, the court
did not go so far as to state that magistrates could not only adjudicate, but could
serve as arbitrators under private contracts calling for binding arbitration. To do so
153
would have been inconsistent with practices in federal courts around the country
and, most likely, contrary to practices under the cited local court ADR rule quoted
154
above.
The latter lists the term “arbitration” in the context of a range of

144
See DDI Seamless Cylinder Int’l, Inc., 14 F.3d at 1167; Brandt, 552 F. Supp. 2d at 316; Hameli,
930 F. Supp. at 182–83; Ovadiah, 1997 WL 342411, at *10–11; Heenan, 96 Cal. App. 4th at 1003–04.
145
14 F.3d 1163 (7th Cir. 1994).
146
Id. at 1166.
147
Id. at 1165. Judge Posner observed that the stipulated procedure “is so remote from the
procedures that federal judicial officers are authorized to use that the final order emanating from it
might well be void—as if a judge issued an order directing President Clinton to go on a pilgrimage to
Mecca.” Id. at 1166. He acknowledged, however, that “the day may not be distant when federal judges
will be recommissioned (or issued supplementary commissions) as arbitrators. But it has not arrived.”
Id. at 1165.
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930 F. Supp. 171 (D. Del. 1996).
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processes (settlement conferences, mediation, early neutral evaluation, and
summary trials) employed in federal court ADR programs in order to foster
settlement among litigating parties, but not imposing final and binding third-party
155
decisions.
As an element in the array of procedural tools employed by courts to
settle cases short of trial, participation in nonbinding arbitration may be required
156
by courts even in the absence of party consent.
This imposition on the right to
trial is deemed acceptable because, as discussed above, such arbitrations are
typically abbreviated proceedings which are nonbinding in the absence of a post157
hearing agreement, and give parties the option of pursuing a trial de novo.
This
kind of “arbitration” is, again, a very different species from the contractual, legally
binding variety furthered by the Federal Arbitration Act and parallel state statutes,
and knowledgeable courts, practitioners and scholars are careful to distinguish the
158
two.
This fundamental dichotomy between court-connected nonbinding arbitration
and contract-based binding arbitration was noted by a California appellate court in
Heenan v. Sobati, which found “judicial binding arbitration by a sitting judge” to
159
be an oxymoron under California law.
The court observed that California law
establishes two “mutually exclusive and independent” statutory schemes: “judicial
arbitration,” which involves nonbinding decisions and the right to a trial de
160
novo, and “contractual arbitration,” which “takes place outside the legal system
161
without any expectation of further contact with the courts,”
“a private
162
proceeding, arranged by contract, without legal compulsion.”
The Heenan court
then proceeded to offer a rationale why sitting judges have no business presiding
over binding contractual arbitration; significantly, it hinged on the fundamentally
divergent policies respecting the privacy and confidentiality of court trial and
arbitration:
Public judging operates in the public eye, with reported proceedings and under
appellate review, to both dispense justice and “satisfy the appearance of justice.”. . .
These distinctions blur if sitting judges, their salaries paid by the state, conduct
private, binding arbitrations in the public’s courthouses – shielded from the need to
follow established rules of law or to justify their decisions by reason, evidence and
163
precedent.

The Delaware Arbitration Program is an unprecedented experiment that
intermingles, among other things, what is indisputably the core judicial function—
adjudication of the merits of a dispute—and traditional binding arbitration. It thus

155
See generally Amy J. Schmitz, Nonconsensual + Nonbinding = Nonsensical?: Reconsidering
Court-Connected Arbitration Programs, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 587 (2009).
156
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rule requiring parties to attend nonbinding arbitration did not violate their right to a jury trial because
the parties had the option to pursue a trial de novo); Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744 (Ariz. 1977)
(same); In re Smith, 112 A.2d 625 (Pa. 1955) (same).
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Id. at 1000–01.
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Id. at 1002.
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takes the central activity of public judges, that which presents the most compelling
of claims for public access, and cloaks it in an enveloping mantle of confidentiality
under the rubric of “arbitration.” This is in contrast to settlement-oriented
activities which offer less compelling arguments for public access, including the
range of court-connected ADR programs including nonbinding arbitration. As we
will see, however, despite the difference in labels, the only fundamental element of
this program that is not already available to parties is the confidentiality pervading
the scheme.
ii. The key distinguishing element of the Delaware Arbitration
Program is the placement of proceedings before a sitting judge
behind closed doors
While it is not unheard of for judges to make arbitral appointments pursuant
164
to a contract, this appears to be the first reported scheme where all appointments
are made by the Chancellor, the appointees are sitting judges, and the judges are
empowered to render final and binding arbitration awards in private proceedings.
Normal arbitrators lack certain powers of courts, including the contempt power,
and therefore parties are required to seek the assistance of courts in enforcing
165
arbitral orders.
Here, because the arbitrators are also judges, they are at least
arguably in a position not only to offer preliminary and final relief in the manner of
normal arbitrators, but also to wield coercive power for the purpose of enforcing
166
the orders they frame.
That said, however, there is language in the
implementing Chancery Court Rules that seems to indicate that many of the
enforcement-related activities that would ordinarily be within the authority of
Chancery judges are instead delegated to the Delaware Supreme Court in a manner
167
analogous to ordinary arbitration.
Nevertheless, in one respect the Delaware Arbitration Program seemingly
makes a significant departure from the model of an analogue to traditional private
binding arbitration. This occurs at the end of the proceeding, when under the
procedures of the Program the conversion of an arbitration award to a court
168
judgment is apparently automatic.
This is a highly distinctive and critically
important aspect of the procedure, because it apparently obviates the need for
parties to act affirmatively to obtain the benefits associated with converting an
arbitration award to a court judgment, such as being able to make use of public
enforcement mechanisms against a losing party as debtor. In traditional
arbitration, as discussed above, the act of seeking judicial confirmation is a public
169
act, and may open some elements of the proceeding to third party access.
Not
so with the Delaware procedure. From the inception of the proceeding until the
docketing of a court judgment, the public record is non-existent or de minimus.
What, after all, does the Delaware Arbitration Program offer businesses that
164
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they did not have before, since they could already count on highly knowledgeable
adjudicators and the promise of a relatively quick and efficient process in regular
court proceedings, and since proceedings (including discovery, motion practice
and conduct of hearings) will probably be substantially similar in either forum?
(Again, it is well understood that today, commercial arbitration often replicates
many of the features of court litigation; one would expect this to be especially so
where the parties have opted for a proceeding conducted by a sitting judge.) True,
the Program affords parties the opportunity to have Chancery judge/arbitrators
address bare claims for damages (as opposed to equitable relief) and to have the
judge/arbitrators act as mediators, but neither of these alone, arguably, would be a
significant draw. In the category of novel, heretofore unrealized benefits there
appears to be only one key element—the opportunity to conduct hearings before a
sitting judge behind closed doors, and to cloak the proceeding—including its very
existence—in secrecy from filing to the automatic docketing of a court judgment.
This, more than any other fact, supports the district court’s conclusion that this is
really court trial by another name.
B. As a Matter of Practice and Policy, Denying Enforcement to the Program
is Unlikely to Have Negative Consequences, While Enforcement May
Produce Negative Consequences
Does it make a difference as a matter of policy and practice whether or not
Delaware is permitted to sponsor a private arbitration program in which the
arbitrators are sitting Chancery Court judges? The proponents of the Delaware
Arbitration Program argue that striking down the program will work to the
detriment of the State of Delaware, harm businesses and undermine court170
connected ADR programs.
The challengers respond that no harm will be done
to the broad run of court-connected ADR, since other programs are fundamentally
different from the Delaware scheme; furthermore, harm to Delaware’s coffers or
business interests should be given no weight in contravention of First Amendment
171
concerns.
Denying enforcement to this particular scheme is unlikely to deal a body
blow to the aspirations of Delaware to enhance its image as the go-to forum for
businesses or to greatly impair the ability of businesses to find favorable
adjudicative forums. Neither would it in any way hamper the ability of courts
around the country to develop and maintain highly effective ADR programs.
On the other hand, upholding the Delaware Arbitration Program could have
negative consequences. A precedent for privatizing court-based, judge-supervised
arbitrations would be a major step in the direction of undermining the role of
courts as public institutions and systems of precedent. It may also blur the
boundary between private binding arbitration and public adjudication.

170
Brief for Appellants, supra note 88, at 66; Brief of Amici Curiae the Chamber of Commerce,
supra note 90, at 23–24.
171
Brief for Appellee, supra note 97, at 48.
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i. Striking down the Delaware Arbitration Program is unlikely to
produce significant negative consequences
a. Impact on Delaware
It is doubtful that the loss of the Delaware Arbitration Program, which has
thus far achieved marginal uptake, will imperil Delaware’s position as a favorable
business forum. While Delaware may not find itself among leading international
“arbitration destinations” (if that was ever a likely outcome of this experiment), its
courts can still craft law favorable to private arbitration. Meanwhile, instead of
moving a portion of their activities to the sphere of purely private adjudication, the
judges of Chancery will continue to perform their judicial duties in the traditional
fashion, rendering decisions that continue to build on body of public precedents
that have characterized and distinguished Delaware jurisprudence.
The greatest loss to Delaware may be the revenue that might otherwise have
entered its coffers had more businesses purchased Delaware charters to avail
themselves of the Arbitration Program. One is tempted to suggest that if revenues
are an issue, as they so often are for courts today, perhaps consideration should be
given to making frequent users pay a heavier share of the burden of providing a
172
public justice system, a burden now borne overwhelmingly by taxpayers.
However, the Program’s proponents might argue that without the carrot
represented by the ultra-private arbitration system, charging business parties a
premium for using the Chancery Court might actually put Delaware at a
competitive disadvantage until jurisdictions around the country start charging
frequent users more of the real cost of litigation.
b. Impact on businesses
As discussed in Part II above, from the standpoint of businesses the
Delaware Arbitration Program offers a particularly advantageous procedural
framework for the resolution of disputes. It is, however, by no means the only way
of accomplishing important business goals and addressing key business concerns
in arbitration. While arbitration before a sitting judge may be problematic, similar
benefits may be obtained in purely private arbitration proceedings with some
degree of planning. Businesses already have the ability to elect to use arbitration
procedures that afford a high degree of privacy and confidentiality, including
173
procedures specifically tailored for protection of intellectual property.
There are also other ways of dealing with concerns about arbitrator decision174
Among other things, parties could
making and application of legal principles.
172
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choose a retired Chancery court judge as their arbitrator. The same may be said of
concerns about promoting efficiency and economy in arbitration. Options exist for
the taking, and much time and effort has been devoted in recent years to providing
175
parties with the opportunity to make choices aimed at these goals.
As long as
the determination reached by the Third Circuit is limited to the unique set of
circumstances inhering in the Delaware program, a decision denying enforcement
to the Delaware Arbitration Program should not seriously affect the ability of
businesses to achieve their legitimate ends through private arbitration.
c. Impact on court-connected ADR programs
Finally, for the reasons discussed above, declining to enforce the Delaware
Arbitration Program will have absolutely no effect on the wide range of ADR
176
programs around the country.
Because the Delaware Program is anomalous, its
non-enforcement is no precedent for judicial enforcement of the broad run of
nonbinding arbitration programs and other procedures, all of which are aimed at
facilitating the achievement of settlements short of court trial.
ii. Upholding the Delaware Arbitration Program may have negative
consequences
On the other hand, should the Delaware Arbitration Program ultimately be
upheld, one could envision potentially significant consequences for courts and for
the general public. Once court-sponsored private arbitration receives judicial
imprimatur, it is reasonable to expect courts around the country to begin offering
such services, and to expect businesses to embrace these options and pay a
premium (if the forum and the tribunal are otherwise acceptable) as a convenient
way of avoiding the public glare of trial and wrapping the entire proceeding in a
cloak of confidentiality.
Besides severely limiting public access to proceedings in the courthouse,
moreover, this activity could bring us measurably closer to the kind of scenario
long envisioned by those who have argued that the rise of private dispute
resolution (especially binding arbitration) will undermine the public justice system
177
by curtailing the publication of decisional precedents.
The Delaware Arbitration
Program affords parties the opportunity to move court-supervised proceedings
from the public docket (and the system of public precedents) directly into a private
and precedent-less netherworld. The potential impact on the public justice system
is surely as direct and significant than any form of private or public ADR devised
to date, or more so.
Moreover, business interests, some of whom have filed briefs in support of

bad arbitration awards).
175
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the Delaware Arbitration Program, should seriously reflect on the advisability of
further intermingling private arbitration with the public forum. Today, consensual
binding arbitration affords parties considerable room to structure private and
confidential dispute resolution proceedings, in contrast to the presumptively public
forum of litigation. If the boundaries between these spheres become increasingly
fuzzy, even traditional binding arbitration may become less private. As a
California appellate court observed in the course of expressing concerns about
litigants refining arbitration to produce “incoherent hybrids”: “[those] who fashion
such variants should be forewarned that the primary governing law may be the law
179
of unintended consequences.”
V. CONCLUSION
The Delaware Arbitration Program may have been designed as a way of
achieving a veritable arbitration trifecta: (1) a first-rate adjudicator practiced at
applying the law to complex factual scenarios, (2) efficient case management and
short cycle time and (3) a proceeding cloaked in secrecy. On closer analysis,
however, the Program appears to establish a proceeding that is in essence litigation
behind closed doors.
By establishing sitting judges as the keystone of an adjudicative system that
is privatized and presumptively confidential through the rendition of a legally
binding judgment, the Delaware Arbitration Program creates an unprecedented
juxtaposition of public trial and private adjudication, an anomaly that has no
counterparts. The only significant element of the procedure that is not already
available to litigants in public trial or, alternatively, in arbitration—is the
placement of proceedings before a sitting judge behind closed doors. For these
reasons, the court’s conclusion appears well-founded.
It is highly doubtful that the loss of the Delaware Arbitration Program will
imperil Delaware’s position as a favorable business forum. Moreover, it will not
prevent businesses from structuring effective, appropriate, and confidential
arbitration procedures, nor will it undermine the ability of courts to develop and
maintain a wide variety of court-connected ADR programs. If the Delaware
Arbitration Program were upheld, however, the precedent might work tangibly to
the detriment of the public justice system by encouraging businesses to opt out of
public adjudication, with public judges rendering private decisions that are off the
public roles, thereby negatively impacting our system of public precedents. It
might also blur the boundaries between private binding arbitration and public trial,
producing other unintended consequences.
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